States increasingly conclude intra-and inter-regional 
I. Introduction
International investment law is traditionally associated with a web of almost three thousand bilateral investment treaties (BITs). In recent years, however, governments have increasingly turned away from this bilateral mode of governance and have begun to negotiate and conclude regional treaties to protect foreign investors. coupled with arbitral tribunals' expansive interpretation of concepts such as reflective shareholder losses already today make more than one BIT potentially relevant in an investment relationship. 7 The parallel proceedings of the CME/Lauder dispute by one corporate entity (once via the Dutch company CME and once via its American shareholder Lauder) against the Czech
Republic challenging an identical measure under two different BITs (Czechoslovakia-U.S. BIT
and Czechoslovakia-Netherlands BIT) with two arbitral tribunals coming to opposite conclusions is a case in point. 8 Yet, while investment law is thus used to horizontal overlap of parallel BITs, regionalism has added a novel dimension to investment law: vertical overlap of BITs with regional investment agreements. Under this vertical overlap, an investor from country A investing in country B is protected by both a bilateral and a regional treaty signed between countries A and B. For example, a Thai investor in Indonesia can rely on, and may potentially 6 While such vertical treaty overlaps are a relatively recent phenomenon in investment law, overlapping bilateral, regional and multilateral treaties have been commonplace in international trade law throughout its history. 9 Since the inception of the GATT in 1947, multilateral liberalisation and regional economic integration have run side-by-side. In the last two decades, however, regionalisation has also picked up pace in trade law with the conclusion of an unprecedented number of free trade agreements (FTAs), more accurately known as preferential trade agreements (PTAs). 10 Hence, in both trade and investment law we observe an increasing turn towards regionalism and a multiplication of vertical treaty overlaps. 11 Indeed, it is often the very same agreements -PTAs with investment chapters also known as PTIAs (preferential trade and investment agreements) -that produces this overlap.
At the same time, the rise of regionalism plays out quite differently in both bodies of law.
The creation of the GATT/WTO was meant to place the international trade regime on a strong multilateral basis. Hence, the recent surge in bilateral and regional PTAs is commonly understood as a shift away from multilateralism. 12 In investment law, the opposite is true. These differences between trade and investment law may, however, be more apparent than real. In both bodies of international economic law, the rise of regionalism and vertical overlap is, in essence, a governance challenge that presents both threats and opportunities. PTAs are not a danger to the WTO per se, but can be a 'stepping stone' for tariff liberalization and can foster coherence through deep integration commitments that de facto extend beyond the PTA members. 16 Similarly, the rise of regional investment arrangements can reduce but also exacerbate complexities in the investment universe furthering or diminishing the prospect of 13 Under the OECD umbrella negotiations failed in the 1960s and 1990s. parallel. Currently, four treaties is the maximum overlap in our dataset. Hence, vertical overlap is widespread in the IIA universe.
However, this vertical overlap is not evenly distributed among countries. Figure 1a) shows that overlap is concentrated in some parts of the IIA network. States are displayed as circles and lines represent the presence of an investment treaty. Bilateral relationships governed by only one treaty are marked by light, narrow lines. The more treaties govern a relationship, the darker and wider a line becomes. The variety of types of overlap also suggests that there is no single explanation for the occurrence of vertical investment treaty overlap. In some cases, it may be the result of purposefully-conducted regional integration efforts that aspire to create a regional floor in investment protection efforts while maintaining special bilateral ties. In other cases, vertical overlap may be an almost accidental side effect of being part of two separate, but intersecting regional groupings.
To give a further illustration of how diversified investment treaty overlap can be, Figure 
III. Consolidation or co-existence: How do countries deal with vertical treaty overlap?
If regionalisation of investment law produces widespread vertical overlap among investment treaties, then how do countries deal with it in their treaty networks? Countries have two broad options in managing the rise of regionalism. They can either use regionalisation to de jure or de facto consolidate overlapping treaties or they can opt for a co-existence of overlapping treaty layers. Currently, the latter strategy seems to be the dominant one.
A. De jure consolidation
De jure consolidation remedies overlap between BITs and regional treaties by terminating one of the overlapping treaties so that a bilateral investment relationship will only governed by one treaty. For instance, when a regional investment treaty comes into force, a BIT among two of the contracting parties may become redundant and is terminated. Such de jure consolidation comes in two variations. the EU. 34 As a result, the EU will be able to conclude investment treaties with third countries. As of this writing, negotiations with Canada are in their final stages and negotiations with the U.S., Japan and China, amongst others are ongoing. These negotiations raise overlap issues as many EU member states currently have BITs with these countries in place. 35 A recent EU regulation, however, has made clear that these BITs 'will be progressively replaced by agreements of the Union relating to the same subject matter'. 36 Hence, the EU seeks to avoid overlap altogether and instead starts EU investment relations with third countries on a clean slate by replacing existing BITs. Especially if many countries are involved, it may be impossible to negotiate the conclusion of a new treaty and the termination of an old one at the same time. In that case, sequencing is the best alternative, prioritizing the conclusion of a regional treaty to then progressively phase out overlapping older treaties. For example, the EU treaty contains investment protection obligations (albeit different from those found in typical IIAs) 38 which overlap with BITs concluded among EU members usually prior to their EU accession. The legal relationship and overlap between EU law and these intra-EU BITs is complex and is subject to an intense academic and political debate 39 as well as actual litigation 40 . Because of these and other complexities, the Commission is advocating to phase out intra-EU BITs. 41 This ex post consolidation, however, is likely to be time-consuming and cumbersome as EU member states' consent is required and disagreement persists on whether investment protection is sufficiently reflected in EU law. 42 Hence, such ex post consolidation is prone to hold-ups and generally less efficient than ex ante consolidation.
B. De facto consolidation
An alternative strategy is de facto consolidation. It leaves overlapping treaties formally in place.
However, it manages their interaction in a way so that, substantively, only one of the treaties governs a bilateral investment relationship at a given point in time. Switzerland thus plays it safe, akin to the proverbial belts and suspenders, ensuring that investment protection is secured even if the regional treaty were to fail, without risking unpredictable parallelism of treaties. Suspension is also adopted in some Canadian and U.S.
treaties, 45 but it is largely absent in overlapping treaties involving only developing countries.
C. Co-existence
Finally, countries can also refrain from consolidating overlapping treaties altogether leaving them in mere coexistence. This can either be done through simple silence or through an implicit or explicit affirmation of existing parallel treaties. 43 Although the incorporated treaty text could be interpreted differently than the original treaty (e.g. because of differences in the treaties' object and purpose), incorporation should still be considered as de facto consolidation since, leaving aside the interpretive margin, both treaties will thereby contain identical disciplines, which minimizes, or even prevents entirely, the potential for functional or normative conflict encountered otherwise under our heading of 'co-existence'. 44 
D. Conclusion
The above account of different strategies in dealing with overlap suggests that there is variation in how countries deal with overlap. Some seize regionalism as an opportunity for consolidation, others opt for parallel treaty layers. Indeed, the same country may approach treaty overlap differently depending on the treaty and the parties involved. 48 At this point in time, it is impossible to determine whether the regionalisation of IIAs will bring about a significant consolidation of the BIT universe since, especially in the EU context, the consolidation process is still in the making. 49 What can be said, however, is that, currently, most states opt for coexistence rather than de facto or de jure consolidation in their treaty networks. Across the globe, regionalisation has thus lead to an increase of unconsolidated layers of vertically overlapping investment treaties. These challenges are not specific to investment treaty law, but are associated with vertical overlap of co-existing treaties more generally. Therefore, we can look at them from a comparative perspective. By drawing from the international trade regime, which has long been marked by the interaction of bilateral, regional and multilateral treaties, we can assess the challenges international investment law faces and the solution it develops from a comparative angle. Of course, there are a number of important differences in the legal architecture of the two bodies of law. Yet, while being mindful of these differences, this section will show that there is still considerable potential for cross-fertilization.
IV. Managing unconsolidated vertical overlap: Trade and Investment Law compared

A. Functional coordination: Duplication, contradiction or differentiation
Where two treaties govern the same bilateral relationship, functional coordination describes what role the contracting parties have assigned to each instrument. If the contracting parties have not purposefully assigned specific roles to each treaty layer, i.e. no functional coordination, the two treaties may simply duplicate each other, providing no value-added. Even worse, a lack of functional coordination could also result in unintended contradictions undermining the objective of either treaty. Therefore, it is desirable for contracting parties to assign each treaty its particular role. For example, a regional treaty may set a minimum floor, as for instance done in the OIC investment treaty, allowing bilateral treaties to provide more preferential treatment. 50 Or, a regional treaty may complement bilateral treaties, e.g. by setting up an additional infrastructure 50 See OIC investment treaty, Preamble ('consider the provisions contained therein as the minimum in dealing with the capitals and investments coming in from the Member States') and Article 18 ('Two or more contracting parties may enter into an agreement between them that may provide a treatment which is more preferential than that stipulated in this Agreement').
like the Unified Agreement on Arab Capital establishing the Arab Investment Court. 51 Whatever these assigned roles may be, it is important that they exist so that the inevitable interaction among treaty layers takes place in a purposefully design, structured and anticipated manner rather than in an unexpected and potentially detrimental haphazard fashion.
In international trade law, we observe such a functional differentiation. Undoubtedly, this is facilitated by the existence of the WTO as a multilateral institution providing countries with a common reference point for functional differentiation. Nevertheless, these coordination clauses provide an essential ideational framework setting out the 'dos and don'ts' for regional integration that assist states and policy-makers to rationalize the interaction between different layers of trade governance.
In international investment law, functional coordination and differentiation is more difficult to achieve. First, a common multilateral focal point like the WTO is missing. Second, levels of investment protection are not as easily measured as reductions in tariff lines or extensions of patent durations. Third, investment treaties today are not anymore only about 'more' investment protection. Rather increasingly bi-directional investment flows coupled with the threat of investor-state arbitration have given rise to a new generation of investment treaties that protects investment abroad while safeguarding policy space at home through more fine-tuned and balanced treaties. 55 Preferentialism is thus not equivalent to stronger investment protection.
In investment law, we are hence looking at a more decentralized and more complex functional differentiation between treaties along the lines of 'investment-protection-plus', 'investmentprotection-extra' and, increasingly also, 'investment-protection-minus' provisions. Nevertheless, a simple functional differentiation seems possible also for overlapping investment treaties. Here WTO law may provide useful guidance, especially in the more analogous field of intellectual property (IP) rights protection. TRIPS Article 1(2) states that Members may, but shall not be obliged to, implement in their law more extensive protection than is required by this Agreement, provided that such protection does not contravene the provisions of this Agreement.
The article ensures functional coordination and differentiation in three ways that can also be applied to the investment treaty context. First, the TRIPS sets a minimum standard which makes existing bilateral IP treaties that correspond or fall below this standard superfluous. Second, it allows more extensive protection standards for those countries willing to go further through bilateral IP treaties. Third, it ensures consistency between the different levels of governance by mandating compliance with the TRIPS Agreement.
Unfortunately, current investment treaties largely lack such explicit functional differentiation and coordination among treaty layers or do not go far enough. For instance, whereas Article 3 of the Unified Agreement on Arab Capital identifies the treaty as setting a minimum standard, it does not regulate consistency issues with bilateral agreements that go beyond this standard.
Similarly, Article 32 of the COMESA Investment Area comes close to the TRIPS approach regulating the content of future overlapping agreements (para. 2) as well as existing agreements with third countries (para. 5), but it remains silent on the content of existing overlapping BITs concluded among its member states.
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In any event, the relationship between BITs and regional agreements does not always follow the pattern of regional floors and deeper bilateral integration ('investment-protectionplus'/'investment-protection-extra'). The trilateral investment treaty between China, Japan and South Korea (2012), which overlaps with three BITs, is a case in point. The China-Japan BIT (1988) limits investor-state arbitration to compensation over expropriation. Hence it provides less instead of more substantive protection (no 'investment-protection-plus') than the regional treaty.
The BIT is also more limited in scope not containing, for instance, limitations on performance requirements (no 'investment-protection-extra'). The Japan-Korea BIT (2002), in contrast, contains arguably more investor friendly protection standards than the Trilateral Agreement e.g.
an unqualified (not linked to customary international law) fair and equitable treatment clause ('investment-protection-plus') and is broader in scope providing for pre-establishment national treatment and more extensive limitations on performance requirements ('investment-protectionextra'). However, it also has exceptions, e.g. on public health, absent in the Trilateral Agreement ('investment-protection-minus'). Hence, rather than developing a coherent approach of functional differentiation and coordination, it seems that the drafters made little effort to effectively manage 56 The COMESA Investment Area Article 32 reads: 1. This Agreement or any action taken under it shall not affect the rights and obligations of the Member States under existing agreements to which they are parties. 2. Nothing in this Agreement shall affect the rights of the Member States to enter into other agreements not contrary to the principles, objectives and terms of this Agreement. 3. In the event of inconsistency between this Agreement and such other agreements between Member States mentioned in paragraph 2 of this Article, this Agreement shall prevail to the extent of the inconsistency, except as otherwise provided in this Agreement.
the treaty overlap. If the three countries had followed a TRIPS-like approach instead, they would have 1) terminated the China-Japan BIT which is largely superfluous, 2) let the Japan-Korea BIT remain in place for its additional commitments e.g. on pre-establishment ('investment-protectionextra') and 3) streamlined its 'investment-protection-plus' and 'investment-protection-minus' commitments through amendments to make it consistent with the principles of the 2012 Trilateral
Treaty.
The failure of contracting states to functionally coordinate overlapping treaties ex ante has unfortunate consequences. First, it results in unnecessary duplication and inherent contradictions, which ultimately harms all stakeholders by increasing transaction costs and decreasing predictability in investment protection. Second, the task of coordinating these treaties ex post is farmed out to arbitral tribunals. The interplay of parallel investment treaties will then have to be tested in actual disputes. We will consider next the two main questions of coordination tribunals will need to decide in such cases: whether investors can bring parallel proceedings and which treaty prevails in case of a normative conflict.
B. Jurisdictional coordination: Proceedings in parallel fora
Where two investment treaties overlap and each provides states' consent to international arbitration, the same investor can have two shots at a respondent state: first filing a claim under the BIT and then, after being (un)successful, trying it again under the regional treaty (or vice versa) -a problem also known as double jeopardy. Double jeopardy poses a serious threat to finality, consistency and justice in international economic law adjudication and must therefore be The international law principles of res judicata and lis pendens are frequently cited in academic writings as tools to avoid double jeopardy. 57 Res judicata prevents the re-litigation of already decided disputes safeguarding finality in adjudication. 58 Lis pendens prevents parallel proceedings of on-going disputes. 59 To be applied, both principles require a triple identity: 1) identity of the dispute, 2) identity of the parties and 3) identity of the cause of action. 60 The strict application of this triple-identity test inhibits the application of these principles to factually related, yet formally independent, proceedings. In investment law, the principles could not be used in the CME/Lauder case, because, at least formally, two different investors were involved, 62 The fact that a claim is filed under two different treaties may thus prove fatal to an application of these principles to either trade or investment law prompting some commentators to advocate a more relaxed reading of these criteria. 63 In the case of vertically overlapping investment treaties, however, one should not brush aside the possible application of res judicata or lis pendens. In such proceedings, not only are the parties and the dispute likely to be identical, but also the causes of action may be the same. What is required is a careful comparison of the jurisdictional basis of each tribunal. Some investment treaties limit state's consent to international arbitration to disputes over that particular investment treaty. 64 The Chile-Vietnam BIT (1999), for instance, restricts jurisdiction in Article IX to 'disputes which arise within the terms of this Agreement, between a Contracting Party and an investor of the other Contracting Party [...]' (emphasis added). As a result, the tribunal's jurisdiction will be limited to that investment treaty and no identity of causes of action with a claim launched under a parallel regional investment treaty can arise. Other BITs, however, contain broader jurisdictional clauses involving 'any dispute relating to investment'. 65 In that case, an arbitral tribunal's mandate is not confined to the four corners of the treaty. It may thus assess the conduct of a state on the basis of both investment treaties simultaneously applicable.
Were the investor, after being unsuccessful under such a first arbitration, then to launch a subsequent claim under the regional treaty, the tribunal would be bound to reject the claim for reason of res judicata as the triple identity test is met.
Many regional investment treaties characterized by parallelism, however, tend have a limited jurisdictional ambit precluding the successful application of these principles. 66 An alternative means to regulate interaction between parallel fora is through explicit treaty clauses. In trade agreements these clauses vary in sophistication. 67 Deep integration organizations like the EU tend to allocate exclusive jurisdiction to its courts preventing members from bringing an intra-regional trade dispute to the WTO. Simple free trade argreements, in contrast, tend to leave it to the claimant which forum to invoke, but typically make this choice final. Such fork-in-the-road clauses are also employed in investment law to coordinate between domestic courts and international proceedings. For example, Article 8(2) of the Argentina-France BIT reads:
Once an investor has submitted the dispute either to the jurisdictions of the Contracting Party involved or to international arbitration, the choice of one or the other of these procedures shall be final. Thereby, NAFTA excludes parallel proceedings, including under a vertically overlapping treaty, e.g. the TPP once it is in force. A waiver clause is superior to a fork-in-the-road clause in two ways. First, it does not depend on the jurisdictional clause of a treaty to be effective but can be framed more broadly as waiving any claims relating to the same measure. 70 Second, it has a life independent of the treaty. As a 'unilateral act' of the claimant, 71 it derives its legal value not only from the contractual instrument pursuant to which it is made but also, independently and more universally, from the principle of good faith and, relatedly, estoppel, preventing the claimant from reneging on the representation made to the detriment of the responding state that relied on this promise as pre-condition for consent.
While a subsequently seized tribunal must hence give effect to a waiver, much of its actual effectiveness depends on the exact wording of the waiver. The trilateral China-Japan-South Hence, they constitute one example of how trade law can learn from investment law. Indeed, nothing prevents a trade treaty from requiring a similar waiver from its claimants.
C. Applicable law coordination: Conflict of norms
A final problem of coordination between overlapping treaties arises with respect to the question of how normative inconsistencies are to be resolved. BIT and a regional treaty apply in the same dispute. Conflict of law rules will then decide which norm prevails in a given dispute.
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The two approaches are based on a different mix of jurisdictional and applicable law clauses (see Table 2 ). primarily be dealt with through the jurisdictions tools discussed in the previous section.
The situation is very different for treaties containing a broad applicable law clause. In that case, a tribunal seized under treaty A will be able to apply treaty A as well as an overlapping treaty B. How the applicable law can be used, however, depends in turn on the jurisdictional clause in which the tribunal's mandate is grounded. If the jurisdiction of a tribunal seized under treaty A is narrow, then treaty B can be used to excuse violations of that treaty. If the jurisdictional scope is broad, then both treaties A and B can be used to assess compliance with both treaties A and B. In the latter two scenarios, it is a question of conflict of norms which law will decide the issue. applied. Since that tribunal could not make any findings on compliance with the BIT (narrow jurisdiction), the rights and exceptions granted in the BIT may prove more relevant than the obligations contained therein. Vice versa, the Thailand-Indonesia BIT has a broad jurisdictional clause (Art. 10(1) 'any dispute … concerning an investment') and is silent on its applicable law, which by reference to applicable arbitration rules, will be interpreted as allowing a broad applicable law. 76 Hence, a tribunal seized under the Indonesia-Thailand BIT will be able to assess compliance with both the BIT and the ASEAN CIA using both treaties as applicable law. 
(2))
Several tribunals grappling with the overlap between EU law and intra-EU BITs/ECT scrutinized these three possibilities. In these cases, however, the differences, amongst others, of subject matter between EU law and IIAs precluded the applicability of these conflict clauses, as Thailand under the BIT, the normative conflict will be resolved in favour of the earlier treatythe BIT -so that Thailand has to pay compensation. Had the ASEAN CIA opted for silence the lex posterior rule would have applied (category 2) making the regional treaty prevail over the BIT resulting in Thailand not having to pay compensation.
The above example demonstrates that it is crucial that states think carefully about how they want normative conflicts to be resolved. If states want to preserve normative innovation, they should opt for category 2, which, in the investment law context, will typically mean favouring a more recent generation of treaties that balances regulatory concerns and investment protection. If relevance of Articles of these VCLT provisions see also Reinisch, 'Articles 30 and 59 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in Action' (n 42). 78 Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law (n 72) at 283 ('The incompatibility or conflict required for the earlier treaty to be terminated must hence be of a rather serious nature: it must result in the impossibility of both applying both treaties -not just the two provisions of the two treaties to be applied at the same time'). 79 Ibid. at 332-335.
states opt for category 3, they chose to favour an older generation of bilateral treaties that typically have more stringent investment protection standards and few public policy exceptions.
States may also want to make these choices explicit, rather than relying on public international law default rules, and design specific conflict clauses in their treaties. The Chile-Peru FTA The advantage of such ad hoc consultations is that states can wait until a normative conflict arises before having to make their policy choices. At the same time, in light of an on-going dispute, state parties may have opposing interests making it unlikely that a diplomatic solution to the normative conflict can be found.
Given that most regional treaties reviewed contain conflict clauses that either explicitly or implicitly (by letting the earlier treaty prevail) favour investment protection, responding states will find it difficult to benefit from legal innovation directed at introducing more policy space in newer regional investment treaties that overlap with older BITs. As we saw above, Thailand is likely to lose its fictional expropriation dispute. But all may not be lost for Thailand. In international trade law, because of its restrictive applicable law, much of the interaction between international law, a presumption against normative conflict exists. 84 Hence, before an arbitral tribunal has to resort to conflict of law clauses, it a may be able to resolve apparent contradictions through a harmonious interpretation. In our fictional case, the ASEAN CIA could be read not as contradicting the expropriation clause under the Indonesia-Thailand BIT, i.e. no conflict of norms, but as merely clarifying the ambit of 'indirect expropriation' allowing for a harmonious interpretation.
The argument would be as follows. Article 31(3)c) of the VCLT provides that 'any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties' shall be taken into account when interpreting a treaty term. Since, in case of a BIT dispute, the parallel regional treaty will be by definition 'applicable in the relations' between the contracting parties, it will inform the BIT for the purposes of interpretation. 85 Article VI of the BIT on expropriation must then be interpreted in light of the overlapping ASEAN Agreement, which, in Annex 2, clarifies the meaning of expropriation and states in paragraph 4 that
[n]on-discriminatory measures of a Member State that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health, safety and the environment, do not constitute an expropriation. 83 See above n 74. 84 Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law (n 72) at 240-244. 85 Of course, vice-versa the same technique would not work, as a BIT overlapping with a regional treaty may not be used for interpreting the latter since it is not applicable in the relations of all the parties to the regional treaty.
As a result, a tribunal may find that the measure in question is not an expropriation in the meaning of BIT Article VI read together with Annex 2 of the ASEAN CIA.
Whether an arbitral tribunal opts for the harmonious interpretation or the conflict of law route will depend on the proper construction of the contracting parties' intention as expressed in the treaty. 86 If this indicates that contracting parties wanted each parallel treaty to be a self-standing instrument with its own insulated treaty terms, a true conflict of law should be presumed, and a tribunal should give effect to the conflict clause. The China-Japan-South Korea Trilateral Agreement Article 25 is an unambiguous example of contracting states mandating a conflict of law approach by explicitly leaving BITs 'unaffected' by the regional treaty. 87 Similarly, in
Article 4.1(3) of EFTA-Ukraine FTA, the parties explicitly prevent the regional treaty to be used for interpretation. 88 If, however, the later treaty clarifies and expands on the meaning of treaty terms also found in the earlier treaty, legal innovation rather than a conflict of norms should be presumed and a harmonious interpretation pursued. 89 This is because international law expects that contracting states act consistently in the relations between the same parties and imposes a high threshold of explicitness before a tribunal finds that two countries engaged in contradictory treaties as between the same parties on the same subject matter. 90 In case of the ASEAN CIA, it is doubtful whether this higher threshold of wilful contradiction is met, which suggests instead a 86 The Tribunal in Electrabel rejected the existence of a principle of harmonious interpretation (para. 4.130), yet nevertheless determined that EU law and the ECT should be read harmoniously drawing from the ECT's genesis, objectives and its implicit recognition of EU law to ascertain the intention of the parties to leave both agreements in harmonious coexistence (n 31) (paras. 4133-4.142). 87 'Nothing in this Agreement shall affect the rights and obligations of a Contracting Party […] under any bilateral investment agreement …' 88 'The provisions of this Chapter shall be without prejudice to the interpretation or application of the rights and obligations under any other international agreement relating to investment or taxation to which Ukraine and one or several EFTA States are parties.' (emphasis added) 89 Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law (n 72) at 242 ('The presumption against conflict is a presumption in favour of continuity'). 90 Ibid. at 240 ('For a new norm to deviate from existing law explicit language must be found. In cannot, in other words, be presumed that states "changed their minds"').
harmonious interpretation that favours legal innovation. So Thailand may not have to pay compensation after all.
V. Conclusion
The regionalisation of investment law has given rise to widespread vertical overlap among investment treaty layers. Today, every fourth bilateral interstate relationship is covered by more than one investment treaty and on-going negotiations of large inter-regional investment treaties will further exacerbate this overlap. What makes this situation particularly challenging is that regionalism is not widely used to consolidate ensuing treaty overlap. Most countries opt for parallel treaty layers, with BITs and regional PTIAs existing side-by-side, rather than for de facto or de jure consolidation.
Unconsolidated overlap can create a number of serious legal problems ranging from functional duplication or contradiction to parallel proceedings and normative conflicts. As a result, states must carefully design and manage the interaction of parallel layers of investment governance. The good news is that coordination tools exist to successfully tackle these challenges. Here, trade and investment law, both facing similar governance challenges arising from treaty overlap, can learn from each other. Investment law can benefit from the mechanism trade law uses to achieve functional coordination. Trade law can draw from investment law's experience in preventing parallel proceedings. In terms of conflicts of norms, both fields have developed distinct but equally effective strategies.
The bad news is that managing treaty overlap requires considerable foresight and sophistication. Treaty interaction has to be anticipated and purposefully channelled by the contracting states. Where states fail in this task, the consequences are dire. Some investors will be lost in the labyrinth of uncoordinated overlapping investment agreements. Others will take advantage of the system risking double jeopardy and an increased exposure of host states to investment claims. Finally, treaty innovation will be undermined as old treaties trump new ones in case of normative conflict. It is thus indispensable that states, if they opt for co-existing treaties, carefully coordinate between different treaty layers in terms of their function, jurisdiction and applicable law. Farming this task out to arbitral tribunals to be resolved in actual disputes on an ad hoc basis is undesirably and even irresponsible given the important underlying policy issues involved.
